The paper puts forward, and empirically explores, claims on how the literature on political agendasetting could inform the concept of mediatized politics. We use as a starting point the lack of empirical research within mediatization studies, arguing that the field of political agenda-setting offers important supplements through systematic investigations of the media's role in promoting social problems on the political agenda. However, this does not imply a straight-forward merging of the two traditions. Instead, we discuss how agenda-setting perspectives offer a more active and visible role for political actors and political logics in the media-politics relationship, presenting analyses that find media influence on political issue attention to be conditioned by policy responsibility and the competition between opposition and government. Furthermore, we take issue with the zero-sum game interpretation of the media-politics relationship, where mediatization necessarily implies decreasing political influence. In our view, future research, on both mediatization and agenda-setting, needs to address how the media (re)distributes power between different actors or institutions in politics. As a first step towards this goal, we try to show that opposition parties (in some respects) are more mediatized than government, but that this constitutes an opposition strength in party competition.
Introduction
This paper explores the concept of mediatized politics from the perspective of political agendasetting. The two literatures of mediatization (cf. Strömbäck 2008) and political agenda-setting (cf. Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006) share an empirical focus on how mass media influence politics. Yet they are rarely seen in connection. Studies of political agenda-setting have largely concentrated on empirical tests of the relationship between issue agendas in media and politics. To be sure, this field of study could profit from the theoretical perspectives developed in the mediatization literature, both when contextualizing findings and when developing research questions and hypotheses. However, as a careful start of bringing the two traditions closer together, this paper focuses on how political agenda-setting could contribute to extant understandings of mediatized politics. After a brief review of mediatization perspectives, we start at the core of political agendasetting, arguing that the literature's systematic empirical studies of issue content and the role of the media in promoting social problems on the political agenda supplement the strong emphasis on conceptual discussions of form/format in mediatization research. Using this as a foundation, two claims are developed and empirically illustrated. The first is that political agenda-setting studies offer a more active and visible role for political actors and political logics in the mediapolitics relationship, as exemplified by recent agenda-setting contributions finding that media influence on politics is conditioned by party politics and party competition (cf. Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010) . The second claim is that the media-politics relationship too often is portrayed as a zero-sum game, where a media logic is pit against a political logic. In order for research on both mediatizaton and political agenda-setting to move forward, there's a need to address how the media (re)distributes power between different actors or institutions in politics.
The claims are substantiated using evidence from a Danish study of party responses to news stories. First, however, the literature on mediatization will be briefly presented, before elaborating on the claims and on the potential synergies between the two literatures. The design section describes the data on media and party agendas from Denmark, while the subsequent analytical section presents and discusses the empirical results.
Mediatization of politics
The fact that politics is mediated and that the media is the 'most important source of information and channel of communication between the citizenry and political institutions and actors' (Strömbäck 2008: 236) is the cornerstone for any perspective on media influence or media effects in political communication. The concept of mediatization is, however, a more useful tool by which to investigate media influence on politics. Several authors argue a clear distinction between the two concepts (cf. Mazzoleni 2008; Strömbäck 2008) , where mediation concerns the straightforward act of transmitting messages through media while mediatization concentrates on a more complex process through which media communication shape and reshape society and politics. Schulz (2004: 88-89) relates the latter concept to changes in communication media, such as the development of new communication media and increasing spread or use of different media, that lead media activities to completely or partly substitute social activities and institutions. In terms of how these processes affect politics, Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 250) offers one of the most widely cited definitions: "mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media".
Although definitions might vary slightly, a common ingredient is that mediatization involves increasing media influence in society and politics (Mazzoleni 2008; Hjarvard 2008; Strömbäck 2008 Strömbäck , 2010 . Most often, this influence is conceptualized in a zero-sum game interpretation where gains for some actors come at the expense of others (Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011: 32) : in other words, mediatizaton of politics implies a decreasing importance of political logic and influence (cf.
Meyer 2002; Strömbäck 2008).
Furthermore, several contributions see the increasing media influence as something which takes place when a media logic or media forms or formats come to dominate political communication (cf. Altheide and Snow 1979; Hjarvard 2004; Mazzoleni 1987) . One example could be activities such as political campaigning that previously involved more direct communication between politicians and the public, but now is almost exclusively something which takes places in the media. The notion of a media logic was first introduced by Altheide and Snow (1979: 10) as a form of communication connected to "how material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication".
A slightly more accessible perspective, suggested by Strömbäck (2008) , sees media logic and its institutionalization in politics as a process where the news value criteria and storytelling techniques of the media become more and more dominant. Esser and Matthes (2013: 177) portray this media logic as an incentive structure that shapes political processes. The point is that todays 'media democracies' constrain the choice sets of political actors, effectively encouraging forms of political communication that devalue political substance at the cost of conflictual, sensational, personalized and simplified messages. Strömbäck (2008) goes on to distinguish between four dimensions of mediatization, where level of meditization is determined by: (1) the degree to which the media are the most important source of information and channel of communication, (2) the extent to which media are independent from political institutions, and the degree to which media content (3) and political actors (4) are governed by a media or a political logic.
Even though the literature has devoted its main share of attention to conceptual discussions, recent years have seen some attempts to explore mediatized politics empirically. For instance, related to the 3rd dimension of mediatization, there is evidence to support that journalists retain the most power of the content and framing of news (Strömbäck and Nord 2006) and that mediatization of news content is stronger in the US compared to European countries (cf. Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011; Esser 2008) . This is reflected in a higher degree of media interventionism, as journalists increasingly report on politics in their own words leaving less and less room for the voice of political actors in political news. Media control of media content does however not necessarily threaten a balanced news coverage, as shown by studies of direct democratic campaigns in Switzerland where the media reproduced the frames of political actors and also reported equally on pro and con arguments (Hänggli and Kriesi 2010) . Another set of newly published studies looks at how mediatization affects the organization of European political parties. Among the clearest noticeable trends, based on case studies in Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland, was the increase in organizational resources for communication ([Donges 2008 ] referenced in Esser and Matthes 2013). Although the empirical picture is becoming clearer, most pieces of the mediatized politics puzzle are nevertheless missing. As pointed out by one of the most active contributors to the field, there is still "a remarkable dearth of systematic empirical research on the mediatisation of politics" (Strömbäck 2011: 423) .
Agenda-setting as mediatized politics?
The literature on political agenda-setting concentrates on the degree to and ways in which the media agenda influences the agendas of political actors. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of 'who influences whom'. However, acknowledging the reciprocal nature of the relationship between media and politics, recent studies have concentrated on identifying the conditions under which news becomes politics (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006) . The main results indicate that concentrated policy responsibility or institutional ownership makes news influence more likely, as witnessed by presidential responses to foreign policy relative to domestic issues (Wood and Peake 1998) ; dramatic and sensational issues like crime and environment are more prone to media effects than for instance undramatic and abstract issues like taxes and public sector reforms (Soroka 2002; Walgrave et al. 2008) ; loss of domestic policy influence through processes of multi-level governance increases media influence on parliament, as seen in relation to EU-dominated issue like environment and agriculture (van Noije et al. 2008) ; media coverage more often sparks party attention when it deals with issues that the parties care about or 'own' (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011) .
Few attempts have been made to look at how the literatures of mediatized politics and political agenda-setting inform each other (for an exception, see Strömbäck (2011: 426) ). To fill this gap, the current paper explores potential synergies between the two traditions, both theoretically and empirically. Writing from within the field of political agenda-setting, our goal at this early stage of communicating across perspectives is three-fold: First, we hope to illustrate how existing empirical descriptions of mediatized politics could be strengthened by taking into account the key results of political agenda-setting studies. Second, we would like to increase the attention to political logics in mediatization processes. Finally, we (re)introduce a target for future research, in both agendasetting and mediatization studies, that could produce more knowledge about how the media affects the distribution of power between different political actors and institutions in society.
Below, we elaborate on these goals. For the latter two, the subsequent discussions serve as a starting point for the empirical analyses that are presented and discussed after the section on research design.
As the above review indicates, mediatization studies have been characterised by a strong focus on theorizing and a neglect of empirical research. This makes for an interesting contrast to agendasetting studies, where the situation has been rather the opposite. On the one hand, this means that the latter field could benefit from a closer look at the richness of theoretical perspectives within the mediatization literature. Our focus here however, is on the ways in which agendasetting offers systematic empirical investigations of the news-politics relationship. At the core of this contribution, is the original agenda-setting hypothesis (a simple signal-response model): when news saliency increases and an issue rises on the media agenda, the probability of a political response increases and the issue moves higher up on the political agenda. The strength of this effect varies, and the opposite pattern of influence is certainly also a fitting description of the media-politics relationship in many situations. Still, cumulative research efforts clearly indicate that the issues which news institutions focus the most on are likely to become politics.
1 In other words, the outcome of news selection processes influence which issues political actors pay attention to. Mediatized politics is consequently more than a dominance of media forms or formats in political communication. Systematic evidence suggests that the actual content of politics is affected by news attention. Through their agenda-setting function, the media influence which social problems receive political attention and, ultimately, which problems that are met with policy solutions. This would seem highly relevant for a concept of mediatized politics, supplementing the empirical foundation for the claim that the media alters politics.
Balancing the logics of politics and media
However, rather than seeing this as a straight-forward add-on to the mediatization thesis, we argue that the incorporation of the core agenda-setting idea and results should be accompanied by more attention to the motives and incentives of political actors. Basically, our claim is that mediatization studies often overlook the political side of the media-politics relationship, and that agenda-setting in this respect could offer further nuances to extant descriptions of mediatized politics. Studies of political agenda-setting increasingly highlight the many contingencies of media influence on politics (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006) . For instance, recent agenda-setting contributions have applied the theory of issue ownership, according to which a party's history of political prioritization, competence and policy results on a specific issue generates an electoral advantage because the public comes to think of the party as more capable of handling it (Petrocik 1996) . Results show that parties are more likely to respond to news on issues they 'own' (cf.
Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011), with for instance left-wing parties responding more often to news on (un)employment and the environment and right-wing parties concentrating on crime and immigration. This points to a key assumption in the general model of political agenda-setting underlying our argument: for political actors, like parties and interest groups, media attention to issues are opportunities of politicization. In the same way that media logics could be seen as an incentive structure, shaping the way in which political actors communicate their messages, logics of party and issue competition are crucial to whether mediagenerated opportunities of politicization are seized. If they offer a means to politicizing preferable issues, own competence or the incompetence of opponents, then news attention often turn into politics.
The more general implication is that mechanisms of party and issue competition play a role when news triggers political attention. The first empirical task of the paper is thus to demonstrate how the agendas-setting influence of the media is strongly affected by a political logic. Leaving the ownership perspective aside, we direct attention to the basic yet crucial influence of policy responsibility. The argument is that government power is a key factor in understanding how and why political agendas are continuously set by the media (Thesen 2012) . Using a sample of Danish news stories (see section on design and data), distinguishing between political responses from government and opposition parties, we try to show that office position and policy responsibility determine party preferences for different tones in political communication: Opposition parties respond to bad news that implicitly or explicitly attribute blame to the government, because this will help politicize government incompetence. The government responds to good news that reflect positive developments in social problems because this could politicize policy success, but is also forced to react when news explicitly address government responsibility and thereby threatens its' image as responsive and competent. To the extent that this holds true, mediatized politics should be considered as a more evenly matched meeting of a media and a political logic. A process where political actors actively use media attention to their advantage, thus behaving in accordance with a political logic of party competition.
Media and politics as a zero-sum game?
The review suggested that several contributions perceive the media-politics relationship as a zerosum game where a media logic is pit against a political logic. Cook (2005) observes how politicians might win the daily battles but end up losing the war "as they apply standards of newsworthiness to evaluate issues and policies". This notion is widely supported within the mediatization literature, which generally assumes that mediatization implies decreasing political influence. To some extent, this perspective is moderated in the most recent accounts of mediatized politics (cf.
Esser and Mathes 2013). The idea here is that political institutions vary in their need for publicity, and this variation in turn explains why institutions or processes that are "characterized by the power-and publicity-gaining self-presentational aspects of political logic" are more mediatized than those "characterized by the policy-and decision-based production aspects" (ibid.: 177). While this differentiation is useful and inspiring, it is still implicitly based on the zero-sum game assumption: the most mediatized institutions are the biggest losers. This is also reflected in the term 'self-mediatization', which describes politicians' proactive efforts to use the media to their own ends. By emphasizing the downside of such activities, stressing that "there is plenty of evidence that political actors quickly lose control over the news agenda" (ibid.: 178), the image of impotent political actors is to some degree still upheld.
In contrast, we believe that when political actors adapt to or master the media and the media becomes more and more important in society, an a priori conclusion of losses in political influence is at least questionable. What facilitates such an argument is the strong emphasis on form/format in much mediatization research, accompanied by a lack of attention to the issues and problems on the agenda and the question of who benefits from the political attention these problems are receiving. The effect of mediatization on different political actors is an empirical question; some might lose, but others could win. Reintroducing a key question put forward more than three decades ago (Hernes 1978) , but which has remained largely unanswered, we think that both mediatizaton and political agenda-setting studies should devote attention to how the media influence the distribution of power between different actors or institutions in politics.
The second empirical task of this paper is therefore to explore this path of research, providing empirical analyses (from the same Danish case) suggesting that opposition politics is more mediatized than government politics and discuss how this constitutes opposition strength in party competition. The basic theoretical idea is still that opposition and government parties face different constraints when working with the same 'publicity-oriented' activities. Both would like to maximize attention to advantageous issues and avoid the less preferable issues from the media agenda, which lead to different preferences for tones in political communication as argued above.
The point here though, is that the nature of the media agenda, and of party competition, skews the outcome of political agenda-setting processes in favour of opposition parties. We provide two examples to substantiate this claim. First, we show how opposition parties have more opportunities to politicize favourable issues from the media agenda due to a negativity bias in news coverage. Second, we draw on both mediatization and political agenda-setting perspectives and try to illustrate how scandal-like news constitute powerful agenda-setting opportunities for opposition parties. The literatures on personalization of politics (Karvonen 2010 ) and political scandals (Thompson 2000) argue that scandals have become ever more present in politics, due to for instance the declining importance of social cleavages and the convergence of parties' policy positions. Besides reflecting a mediatization of politics, in which the performance of politics takes precedence over policy content, stories of incompetence and lack of integrity have also been
shown to decrease the vote-shares of involved parties (Clark 2009 ). To the extent that opposition parties focus on these stories, trying to increase public attention to minister's caught lying, serious malpractice or incompetence in policy-making or implementation, they constitute a strong opposition asset in media-based party competition.
Design and data
The arguments of the paper are illustrated with data on media and party agendas in Denmark. A sample of more than 2000 news stories from one year (2003) (2004) was coded. Next, each story was 'forwardtracked' to see whether it made it to the opposition's and the government's agenda in the following four weeks. The sections below elaborate on the independent and dependent variables applied in the empirical analyses.
Independent variables
The news stories were collected using Danish radio news broadcasts (twice daily) from the Danish Broadcasting Corporation which in this period held a de-facto monopoly on national radio news.
Studies of the Danish media system point to the influential role of these broadcasts in linking the agenda of morning papers and evening TV news (Lund 2002) Besides the four main explanatory variables presented above, some of the empirical models include a control variable meant to accommodate the reciprocal nature of the media-politics relationship. Specifically, each story was coded according to whether opposition or government played a role in initiating the story. The resulting variables, respectively labelled Opposition initiation and Government initiation, thus indicate instances where the empirical material might be at odds with the agenda-setting idea and where the media-politics relationship possibly could be better described as indexing (Bennett 1990) or party influence on media agendas. For instance, when the government presented a new action plan to fight obesity or when a new book by the PM (re)introduced the idea of an increased retirement age. Thus, the code indicating government initiation reflects the judgment that these stories would not have entered the news agenda (at that specific time) had it not been for the involvement of the government. The inclusion of these variables strengthens the specification of the news to politics relationship in the empirical models, serving to curb endogeneity as their estimates could be expected to influence both independent and dependent variables.
Dependent variables
In The government's agenda was measured through the weekly press-meetings of the Prime
Minister. The meetings are typically held every Tuesday at the Prime Minister's Office, during approximately the same period as Parliament is seated (September to early June). On average, one week a month is without a press-meeting as the PM is occupied with other meetings or journeys.
The meeting takes place right after the weekly ministerial conference, and starts with a 10-20 minutes speech from the PM mainly divided between presentation of issues that have been discussed in the ministerial conference and a few topics of choice on which he speaks more freely.
The measure does not capture those parts of government's issue attention expressed through other ministers and other contexts, but this is alleviated by the fact that the PM represents the whole government. He divides his attention amongst the different ministries, as also his comments to the agenda of the ministerial conference show. Therefore the measure should still qualify as a government agenda and not only a PM agenda. The lack of extensiveness thus primarily means that the agenda space is limited compared to the parliamentary questions from the opposition. Table 1 about here For each story coded in the radio news, the opposition's questions 5 and the Prime Minister's speech at the press meetings 6 were thoroughly read to check whether the story had made it to the opposition and government agenda in the following four weeks.
Analyses and discussions
Using empirical examples from the dataset described above, the two sections below discuss potential contributions of agenda-setting studies to the understanding of mediatized politics. Each section starts off with a recapitulation of the core argument, before presenting empirical evidence to illustrate and support the claim.
The political conditionality of mediatized politics
The political conditionality of political agenda-setting (cf. Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006) , offers a political filter to the simple signal-response model discussed previously. Part of this framework of political conditionality, is the simple idea that news is interesting to politicians if they stand to gain or lose something from the attention it generates. The reason why this, in our opinion, constitutes a supplement to mediatization studies is that politics and political logics become a more visible and important element of mediatized politics. Thus, we will try to show here how the many findings pointing to media influence on political agendas, could be partly explained by a logic of party competition, and how the understanding of media-politics dynamics could be improved by adding just a few political perspectives to the mix.
More specifically, we argue that the nature of party competition and policy responsibility affects party responses to news. In the competition for votes and political power, the mediated state of social problems and the attribution of responsibility for them structure the oppositiongovernment game and how the parties in this game relate to the media agenda. Opposition parties attack using government weaknesses found in bad news stories, reflecting poorly on the way government handles its policy responsibilities. Government, on the other hand, must defend the legitimacy of their policy responsibility, and do so by a two-fold strategy. The strategy of choice is to respond to good news in order to activate positive competence evaluations in the electorate. However, when responsibility is attributed to the government, ignoring bad news is less attractive as the chance of 'getting off the hook' decreases. Bad news featuring blame attributions thus force government to answer in order to uphold its image as responsive and competent.
In order to test this, multivariate logistic regression was used to estimate the empirical relationships between news tone and blame attributions (independent variables) and opposition and government response (dependent variables). The regression models also included other independent and control variables of interest, such as news saliency and variables indicating whether news stories had been initiated by political actors. Results are displayed in the appendix (Table A. 2). In short, the estimated parameters of both news tone and blame attributions are When news worsens the opposition responds, and when news gets better the government responds. Holding all other variables constant, a switch from a one-sided good story to a one-sided bad story triples the chances that opposition parties react to news attention (from .04 to .12). In the case of government, the same change in news tone is accompanied by a halving of response probability (from .031 to .015). where only saliency is used to predict political attention to news. Adding a 'political filter' related to party competition and policy responsibility shows that when the media influence politics, there is most certainly also a political logic at play. Even though a lot of the social problems communicated in the media attract political attention, parties are still in a position to select those problems that serve their interests well. In other words, political agenda-setting and thus also aspects of mediatized politics, involves a political selection of news where party strategies and party competition over votes and office play an important role. If not a counter-argument to the mediatization thesis, this at least serves as a more careful or balanced perspective on media influence on politics.
Mediatized politics and the opposition-government game
The final claim of the paper was that the relationship between media and politics should not only be seen as a zero-sum game, and that research on both mediatized politics and political agendasetting will have to address how the media influences the distribution of power between different political actors and institutions. Following our own suggestion, we present a couple of empirical examples (from the same Danish case) suggesting that opposition politics is more mediatized than government politics, and arguing that this provides the opposition with an advantage in its competition with the government.
First, the collected empirical material which the present paper is built on show clear traces of a negativity bias in the media. The average share of negativity in the sampled radio news agenda is 63 pct. Measured alternatively, nearly 48 pct. of the news stories are more bad than good, with 31
pct. neutral and only 21 pct. more good than bad. The 'common knowledge' holding that media tend to concentrate on negative issue developments is thus confirmed. Furthermore, blame attributions containing explicit government criticism features in 12 pct. of the news stories. With the response patterns from the previous analyses in mind, there should be little doubt that the nature of the media agenda assures opposition parties considerably more opportunities to activate agenda-setting advantages.
Adding to this, the models reported above suggest that opposition parties are more influenced by news attention, while government responses to a much higher degree follow in the wake of their own policy initiatives and statements (cf. the coefficient of 'Own initiation', Table A .2). Although opposition politics thus could be labelled more mediatized, this should not be read as a sign of weakness. Rather, news negativity and the mechanisms of opposition and government response together facilitate a context where for instance bad news featuring blame often will dominate issue dialogue in party competition. From the perspective of political agenda-setting then, the fact that opposition politics is more mediatized means that opposition parties have more opportunities and stronger incentives to join or initiate dialogue on the basis of news stories.
Second, so-called non-policy valence events (Clark 2009 ) that challenges the government's image with respect to competence and integrity represent extremely attractive agenda-setting opportunities for the opposition. The valence concept (Stokes, 1963 (Stokes, , 1992 has mainly been put to use on policy issues where parties or candidates hold identical positions (reduction of crime, economic growth etc), but also covers values which we expect politicians to adhere to, such as honesty, trustworthiness and competence. The potential of news stories questioning government competence or integrity, derives from the fundamental character of these values. Parties, and their constituencies, often disagree on how social problems are to be handled. But no party and no voter would disagree that political representatives should be able to deal with these problems in a competent and honest manner, regardless of which political solution is chosen. If not, the question whether elected leaders are fit to govern is inevitably raised. And unlike in the case of for instance failed economic growth, which often can be (more or less credibly) attributed to external factors like international economic trends, the blame for non-policy valence failures is virtually impossible to escape.
To investigate the effect that news stories covering non-policy valence events have on opposition responses, the blame variable applied earlier (see Table A .2 and Figure 2 ) was split in two. The resulting two variables, Substance blame and Non-policy blame, distinguish between attributions of blame related more to policy content and stories that deal with the government's lack of integrity or competence. An otherwise identical regression to Model II (Opposition) reported above was then run, the results of which are displayed in the appendix (Table A. 3). The estimated parameters of both blame variables are significant and have the right sign. Mean predicted probabilities are presented in Figure 3 . The results find that the opposition is twice as likely to respond to news that contain substance blame, compared to news without blame. When attributions related to policy content are present, opposition parties respond in 16 pct. of the cases. However, the impact of the agenda-setting advantages brought on by news that challenges government integrity or competence is far stronger. Stories that involve for instance ministers caught lying or serious incompetence/malpractice in policy-implementation or making are 43
percentage points (from .08 to .51) more likely to make it to the opposition's agenda than stories without such elements. response at least points to a subset of issues for which a media logic seem highly influential.
Keeping in mind that these events have been proven to affect the vote shares of involved parties (Clark 2009) , and that government actors carrying policy responsibility are more prone to be involved in these different types of scandals, they could be seen as an example of strong mediatization where the media affect both the form(at) of politics and the distribution of political power in a democratic system.
Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this paper -and agenda-setting studies in general -provide systematic documentation of how the media, through assigning 'political relevance and importance to social problems by selecting and emphasizing certain issues and neglecting others' (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 251) , exert influence on democratic politics. In this way, agendasetting perspectives inform discussions about the 4 th dimension of mediatization, where the key question is the extent to which political actors are governed by a political or a media logic. Looking at the overall results, there is little doubt that media's political agenda-setting power is an important element of party competition. When news institutions mediate a problem at the expense of others, emphasize positive or negative developments and communicate blame, some parties will be advantaged while others will suffer a handicap. Thus, 'mediated realities' (Strömbäck 2008: 238) or media depictions of social problems, and the implicit or explicit attribution of responsibility for them come to influence the opposition-government game. Both in terms of how the players relate to the media agenda, and in the sense that the attention generated will be skewed in favour of the opposition. It is also worth noting that this is found to be the case even in between elections, outside a campaign context. This suggests a situation of permanent campaigning, which Strömbäck notes is characteristic of a fairly strong mediatization of politics.
On the other hand, our emphasis on logics of party and issue competition offers a different take on mediatization, where political perspectives are more visible and more important. This touches upon both the 3 rd and 4 th dimension of mediatization, suggesting a new perspective on the balance between media and political logic. The results supported the core message that policy responsibility and party competition are crucial to political agenda-setting, challenging the notion that politics takes place on media terms as the media have colonized politics and marginalized parties (Meyer 2002) . Rather, mediatized politics involves a political selection of news where party strategies and party competition over votes and office (and policies) play an important role.
Furthermore, the focus on party competition could also question the distinction between media and party logic that prevails in the mediatization literature. For instance, although one could see opposition responses to negative news as a reflecting an adaption to or adoption of a media logic where conflict and polarization is important, we think it is equally right -and useful -to see it as inherent to political competition. In this perspective, strong agenda-setting effects or close interactions between media and politics take place as a result of overlapping, rather than competing, logics.
Concluding, in line with Mazzoleni and Schultz (1999) , we would say that the above results do not indicate a 'media-driven republic'. In the same way that journalists retain ultimate control over media content (Cook 2005 Finally, although it may sound trivial, we need to remember that 'media influence' is of a mediating character. There is no 'party of the media'; even though the media select or negotiate which issues and opinions that will become news, these problems and viewpoints most often originate elsewhere. The media mediate opinions, interests and social problems. Extending this
Notes
1 See for instance review in Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) . We have included a simple empirical illustration in the appendix, based on the data-set applied in this paper. for the study.
7 The probabilities are consistently lower for government response, which is due to differing agenda capacity of the institutions used to measure government and opposition attention. The Prime Minister addresses approximately 5-8 issues in the speech at his weekly press meeting, adding up to a considerably lower number of response opportunities than that found in the institution of parliamentary questioning. I therefore do not focus on differences in the level or absolute size of changes when comparing opposition and government. For the same reasons, the two y-axes on opposition and government response are scaled differently.
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